Rosemary DiCarlo, the United Nations’ Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, arrived in Syria on April 14 to discuss the country’s political transition. She brought with her political transition plan, an alternative to that already outlined by the new Syrian government.  

The UN appears to be reconsidering how to implement the landmark Resolution 2254 of 2015, which proposed a framework for a peaceful transition and political settlement in Syria. Despite Damascus making three key steps towards a transition since toppling the Assad regime in December—the National Dialogue Conference which appointed Ahmad al-Sharaa as President, the drafting of the Constitutional Declaration, and the formation of a transitional government—the UN continues to view Syria as being run by “Interim Authorities,” not a recognized Syrian government.  

The Syria Transitional Action Plan (TAP), the UN’s proposed alternative, is a joint proposal developed by the UN country team in consultation with the Office of the Special Envoy, as well as humanitarian organizations. The plan aims to bolster and sustain the political transition process in Syria, and to maintain the Special Envoy’s leading role in assisting a political transition process in line with Resolution 2254.  

The plan aims to ensures a comprehensive and strategic response in 12 program areas:  

• Financial sector reform and cooperation with international financial institutions.  

• Reconstruction and social and economic development.  

• Addressing sanctions issues.  

•   Refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs).  

•   Social protection.  

•   Constitutional reform and national dialogue.  

•   Elections.  

•   Security sector reform.  

•    Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.  

•    Legal and judicial reform.  

•    Transitional justice.  

•    Media reform.  

The plan re-envisions the UN’s approach in Syria, with a view to ensuring an appropriate response to the evolution of the country’s institutions and socio-economic landscape, preparing the UN to support and accompany Syria in its transition process, and equipping it to provide advisory services and technical assistance, as per the needs of Syrian officials.  

The plan is driven by the principle of extensive consultation with, and the full participation of, all components of Syrian society, civil society organizations, international organizations, national NGOs, local authorities, the Syrian diaspora, the private sector locally and internationally, the donor community, and international financial institutions. It also aims to ensure localization and Syrian ownership to ensure that Syrian institutions, civil society organizations, and local communities work together, alongside the authorities, to jointly lead the process of transition.  

The 34-page plan explains the UN’s role in each of the 12 areas, along with those of its partners. For example, in the area of ​​financial sector reform and cooperation with international financial institutions, it proposes that the UN Country Team act as a bridge between international financial institutions and the interim authorities, helping to formulate policies consistent with international standards.  

In the realm of ​​sanctions, the plan states that one of the goals of sanctions is to compel Syrian actors to engage in the UN-facilitated political process, and that strengthening the UN Country Team’s engagement with the interim authorities in transitional reforms could unlock further sanctions relief.  

In terms of constitutional reform, the plan argues that the UN’s extensive expertise could allow it to support and participate in preparatory mappings and needs assessments on issues related to the design and implementation of measures supporting constitutional reform and national dialogue, as well as in the realm of elections. On the level of security sector reform, the UN could offer support through various specialized departments and affiliated agencies, as well as potentially deploying a group of experts to Syria, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2553 (2020) on security sector reform and governance.  

On the question of implementation, the plan envisions that the UN will need commitment and political will from Damascus to engage in dialogue and the action stemming from it. DiCarlo appears to have sought such commitments from the Syrian leadership during her visit.  

The plan also calls on the international community, national stakeholders, and local actors to work collaboratively, ensuring that reforms are transparent, participatory, and reflect the aspirations of all segments of Syrian society. The international community appears ready to engage in this. DiCarlo’s arrival coincided with a statement by the European Union’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, following a meeting of EU foreign minister in Luxembourg, saying that the EU had not seen many steps from the new leadership, and that Syria’s future remained extremely fragile.  

Kallas said an agreement had been reach to assess the transition process so far, along with an assessment of whether to continue with the EU’s decision to lift certain sanctions. She added that the EU will present its proposals for the next steps in the transition, taking into account its own conditions and red lines. Efforts will also be made on the “technical aspects” of these steps, after which the EU will return to discuss whether it is ready to move forward in Syria.  

The Question of Support  

In addition to the UN’s adoption of the plan and the support of the larger donor community, represented by the EU, the plan is likely to receive local support from humanitarian and civil society organizations, and various segments of Syrian society, as it offers them far greater gains and participation than the transition process undertaken by the government. Many of these groups feel excluded or marginalized, or argue that they have not received their dues.  

Then comes the question of the Syrian government’s view of the plan. The UN proposal differs radically from the world body’s previous humanitarian response plans and strategies, including those for early recovery and reconstruction, such as the 2024-2028 strategy, which was limited to humanitarian intervention. The latest plan is the first to go beyond this, intervening in the overall political transition process in Syria in the 12 areas it outlines, and for which it lays out a comprehensive plan, independent of the Syrian government. For the first time, it brings the UN humanitarian office OCHA together with the Office of the Special Envoy, whose mandate included neither the humanitarian nor the security file. It is also very similar to the 2015 “National Agenda for the Future of Syria” launched by UN Assistant Secretary-General and Regional Director of UNDP, Dr. Abdallah Al-Dardari.  

The latest plan will test whether, in the UN’s view, the shortcomings of the transition underway in Syria are due to the new government’s lack of experience—meaning it could accept the plan and the expertise the UN is offering—or whether it comes down to the new government’s political will to undertake these transitional steps, regardless of the UN’s criteria.  

The Syrian government may reject the plan, viewing it as a form of foreign “guardianship” over the country, interference in its wholesale restructuring of the Syrian state, and an attempt to impose foreign agendas on its military, security, financial, constitutional, and media affairs. The new rulers in Damascus may see the plan as favoring groups currently opposed to the government, strengthening them by demanding social protection for them and obligating the government to partner with people who oppose it.  

Ultimately, it is quite normal for the UN to develop a transition plan for a country emerging from conflict. What is surprising, however, is that it uses the humanitarian response as a condition for engagement with. The plan presents major questions: Would the Syrian government’s failure to respond to the plan affect its international recognition? Would it set back international moves to lift sanctions? Would it lead to a change in the humanitarian aid policies and early recovery projects included in previous UN plans?  

To avoid such outcomes, the Syrian government may resort to opening a dialogue on the plan with the Resident Coordinator and the Special Envoy, demanding that it not be launched prior to consultations with the government. The government must consider the potential risks of either accepting the plan, rejecting it, or asking the UN to make amendments to it in accordance with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in states’ domestic affairs, in a manner that serves the common interest at the national and international levels.